Appealing Rent-Control cases at Bombay High Court: From Grounds to Groundswell

The Maharashtra rent-control regime remains one of the most litigated terrains in Indian property law. While first-instance proceedings typically begin before the Small Causes Court at Mumbai (or the designated Rent Court), the grounds for interfering orders on appeal or revision are exacting, and rightly so.

This article maps the strategic pathways for landlords and tenants when carrying rent-control disputes up the ladder, with a focus on jurisdictional errors, improper denial of eviction, and misapplication of succession (“deemed tenant”) rules under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (“MRCA”). It also situates Bombay practice within the binding Supreme Court doctrine on appellate and supervisory review.

In Mumbai, suits for eviction, standard rent, and allied reliefs lie before the Small Causes Court under the MRCA and the Presidency Small Cause Courts framework. Appeals commonly lie to the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court or, as the case may be, to the designated appellate forum under the MRCA. The Bombay High Court is then moved either by second appeal (where statutorily provided), revision, or Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction, each with distinct thresholds.

Two Supreme Court anchors guide strategy:

• Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78, the Court strictly curated the scope of revisional jurisdiction under rent laws: a revisional court cannot re-appreciate evidence as if it were an appellate court unless the statute expressly permits; interference is limited to jurisdictional error, legal perversity, or material irregularity.

• Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329, under Article 227, the High Court’s power is supervisory, not appellate; it steps in for patent perversity, gross jurisdictional error, or breach of natural justice, not to substitute plausible factual findings.

When architecting a Bombay High Court challenge, label the error precisely - is it a pure question of law (statutory misinterpretation), a jurisdictional transgression, or a finding so perverse that no reasonable tribunal could reach it? Drafting discipline here is often outcome-determinative.

The Bombay rent statute’s exclusive jurisdiction has long been judicially ring-fenced. In Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios (1981) 1 SCC 523, the Supreme Court held that parties cannot contract out of rent-control jurisdiction (e.g., via arbitration) where the statute vests exclusive authority in the rent court. Any forum-diverting device is ineffectual.

Strategic angles for appeal/ revision:

• Mis-characterisation of the relationship (licence vs tenancy vs “conducting agreement”), leading the trial forum to assume or decline rent-control jurisdiction erroneously;

• Non-joinder or misjoinder that vitiates maintainability in a statutory forum with narrow subject-matter competence;

• Arbitration references wrongfully entertained despite Natraj Studios judgment.

Seek setting aside for want of jurisdiction, or a remand with specific directions where factual classification (tenant/ licencee/ deemed-tenant) needs correct framing.

Under the MRCA, eviction typically turns on bona fide requirement, acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation, unlawful sub-letting, persistent default, change of user, or non-user. Appellate strategy must reckon with the standard of review:

• Bona fide requirement: The Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (1998) 8 SCC 119 cautioned against substituting the court’s personal standard of comfort for the landlord’s reasonable need; mere availability of some alternative does not, by itself, negate bona fides unless the alternative is reasonably suitable.

• Maharashtra/ Bombay context: In Raghunath G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co. (1999) 8 SCC 1, the Court, dealing with the Bombay Rent Act (predecessor to MRCA), underscored a pragmatic approach to bona fide requirement - courts should not expect landlords to sacrifice genuine business or residential needs under the pretext of tenant protection.

• Sub-letting: The Supreme Court in KK Krishnan v. AS Khadar (2007) 4 SCC 481, reaffirmed that parting with possession without the landlord’s consent attracts eviction; labels (e.g., “caretaker”) yield to substance - who has control and possession?

Frame challenges as errors of legal principle (misapplication of the bona fide test, wrong burden on landlord/tenant) or perverse fact-finding (ignoring crucial admissions, documentary proof of sub-tenancy, or evidence of non-user). Under Dilbahar Singh, this opens the door for interference even in revision if the findings betray the legal yardstick or are manifestly unreasonable.

Section 7(15)(d) MRCA narrows succession. On the tenant’s death, protection travels only to heirs residing with the tenant at the time of death (with specific hierarchies/time-limits in certain situations). The policy is to prevent evergreen tenancies divorced from actual occupation.

Two Supreme Court guideposts help align the argument:

• Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683, while recognising the heritable nature of tenancy rights (particularly in commercial premises) in the absence of statutory curtailment, the Court equally acknowledged that a statute may validly channel or limit succession. Read with MRCA’s express definition, mere heirship does not suffice.

• HC Pandey v. GC Paul (1989) 3 SCC 77, the Court emphasised actual residence and participation in the tenancy at the relevant time as a determinant, not post-hoc assertions of convenience.

On appeal/ revision, demonstrate misdirection in law where trial courts:

• Conflate legal heirship with statutory deemed tenancy;

• Accept sporadic visits or address entries as a proxy for actual residence;

• Ignore objective indicia, utility bills, voter/ Aadhaar records, bank/ KYC, municipal assessments, and contemporaneous evidence of co-occupation.

Because appellate relief above the first appeal is narrow, the record must do the heavy lifting. Effective Bombay practice includes:

• Document trails: Rent receipts, leave and licence/ consent correspondences, utility consumptions, society records, redevelopment communications, and photographs.

• “Possession reality checks”: Cross-examination that peels back control, keys, and use from nominal descriptions, critical for sub-letting and non-user.

• Targeted admissions: Pin parties to dates of residence, employment postings, and alternative accommodation.

• Finding-by-finding attacks: In the memorandum, map each adverse finding to the missed exhibit/ testimony and the correct legal test—showing Dilbahar Singh-type perversity or legal misdirection.

Where eviction is decreed, appellants routinely seek stay of execution. The Bombay High Court balances equities through conditioned stays (e.g., deposit of compensation/ mesne profits, no-alienation undertakings, periodic compliance). Failure to structure or meet conditions may collapse interim protection. Conversely, landlords resisting stay should quantify prejudice (e.g., redevelopment timelines, deterioration, or tax/ outgo burdens).

Appeals/ revisions must be timely; Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be invoked for sufficient cause, but “administrative delay” without particulars seldom suffices. Precision, date of knowledge, certified copy timelines, counsel illness with proof, matters. A condonation refusal is often unassailable unless the reasoning is demonstrably perverse.

Even whilst appealing, parties can deploy without-prejudice proposals, enhanced compensation, time-bound vacating, or allotment in redevelopment, recorded through consent terms. The Bombay High Court enforces such settlements robustly, limiting scope for post-consent resilement, absent vitiating factors.

Appellate success in Bombay rent-control matters hinges on discipline of characterisation. Identify the right ground, jurisdictional transgression, legal misdirection, or perversity, and then marshal the record to that legal standard.

Supreme Court doctrines, Natraj Studios on forum exclusivity, Sarla Ahuja and Raghunath Panhale on bona fide requirement, KK Krishnan on sub-letting, Gian Devi Anand and HC Pandey on succession, and Dilbahar Singh and Shalini Shyam Shetty on the limits of higher-court interference, provides a coherent toolkit.

In a jurisdiction where statutory protection meets metropolitan redevelopment pressures, the best appeals are those that read like surgical audits, pinpointing the error, aligning it with doctrine, and showing why correction is not merely possible but compelled.

About the author: Divyang Chandan is the Head of Rent Control and IP practice at Chandan & Chandan.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s). The opinions presented do not necessarily reflect the views of Bar & Bench.

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