Sometimes, seemingly mathematical questions put the very first principles of service and constitutional law to the test. The case of Rekha Sharma v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan is a textbook example of this phenomenon.

The question was deceptively simple: if a candidate qualifies for two reserved categories at the same time - say, a person with disability (PwD) who also belongs to the economically weaker section (EWS) - under which category should they be counted? The answer was far from straightforward and required the Supreme Court to decide the method of operationalising horizontal and vertical reservations in a way that was technically sound according to Articles 15 and 16, while preserving the foundational intent behind reservations.

Rekha Sharma, a candidate with low-vision disability who also belonged to the EWS category, narrowly missed final selection to the Rajasthan Judicial Services. Two posts were reserved for blind and low-vision candidates. Although she had cleared the minimum qualifying marks, she was not selected because those two posts had been filled by other candidates with the said disabilities who had scored higher. However, Sharma pointed out that one of the selected candidates also belonged to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) category and had marks above the cut-off for that category. According to her, that candidate should have been adjusted against the ST vertical quota, thereby freeing up one horizontal seat for low-vision disability and clearing the way for her selection.

Vertical reservation refers to the allocation of seats within specific categories such as SC, ST, OBC, or women, where each group has its own separate quota. Horizontal reservation, on the other hand, is a reservation applied across all categories, ensuring that certain groups such as PwDs receive a specific share of the total vacancies, irrespective of their vertical category.

However, this seemingly binary distinction, propounded in Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, has posed interpretational and implementation challenges before various courts across the country. They have often grappled with questions such as whether PwDs should be treated as a separate category for the purposes of seat computation, whether separate cut-off lists should be maintained for their category and whether relaxation of minimum marks is permissible for them. Some courts have held that PwDs are not a separate category and that separate cut offs need not be maintained for them, while others have taken a different view.

In Re-recruitment of Visually Impaired Persons v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice R Mahadevan, stated that a separate category for PwDs must be maintained. But there is still a glaring lack of guidance on the method of implementing these judicial directives.

This complexity multiplies when numerous administrative bodies and exam selection agencies across different states and government departments are involved in the process, with each framing its own rules and regulations. As a result, candidates like Rekha Sharma often get stuck in a system where not only implementation, but even the very interpretation of equality is up for debate and judicial determination.

The Rekha Sharma judgment shows that there is a pressing need for developing a coherent, standardised operational framework for reservation that comprehensively addresses the practical realities of marginalised communities. Additionally, clear judicial guidance on major interpretive and implementation questions surrounding vertical and horizontal reservations can significantly help account for the varied intersectionality of litigants. Lastly, it serves as a reminder to practitioners that only a strategy informed by both social sensitivity and technical rigour can assist the courts in aligning administrative practices with the broader objectives of reservation and service law.

Sharma's legal battle began with her first appeal in 2022 against the non-declaration of separate cut-off marks for PwD candidates in the Rajasthan Judicial Services. She lost in the Supreme Court, which held that the Rajasthan High Court was correct in not declaring a separate cut-off for persons with benchmark disabilities. She tried again, appearing for the 2024 Rajasthan Judicial Service Exams. This time, the Supreme Court ruled in her favour, directing the Rajasthan High Court to appoint her. It did so in exercise of the power to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution. It was only after 9 years of securing her law degree that she was appointed as a judicial officer.

This case serves as a reminder to courts that substantive justice is just as crucial as procedural justice, and that both outcomes and their timeliness are as important as the processes themselves. It is a lesson for practitioners that efficient case management and legal strategies, sensitive to the time-bound nature of the cause of action, are client-centered. Lastly, it reassures litigants that while justice may be delayed, all stakeholders work diligently to ensure it is never denied.

Ultimately, this judgment is not just a victory for a determined candidate, but a reminder that the Court is committed to upholding the constitutional logic behind reservation, even in the face of technical and mathematical arguments. More importantly, it underscores the Court’s ability to recognise litigants in their unequal realities, provided it is given the right lens to do so - a responsibility that lies with the Bar to fulfill diligently.

Anchal Bhatheja is a research fellow at Vidhi Center for Legal Policy and a Consultant at Mission Accessibility.