The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (FSS Act) marked a significant overhaul of India’s food regulatory landscape, bringing together many outdated and overlapping laws under a unified, evidence-based legislation.

Section 4 of the FSS Act established a central governing, namely, the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), entrusted with the central role of regulating all aspects of food from production and storage to distribution, sale and import to ensure consumer safety.

However, almost three decades since its inception, the ambitious goals set by this legislation have often been undermined by persistent challenges in its implementation. The Supreme Court, vide order dated April 9, 2025, in the case of 3S and Our Health Society v. Union of India & Ors, granted three months to amend the requisite Regulation and orally pulled up the FSSAI over delay in implementing front-of-pack nutrition labelling requirements.

This one instance portrays the long-standing issues of ineffective enforcement, weak institutional accountability and administrative stagnation under the FSS Act. Though the statute appears strong in structure, its practical execution remains fragile, rendering the law more symbolic than effective in many respects.

One of the most pressing challenges in implementing food safety regulations in India is the severe shortage of food safety officers (FSOs) at the state level. As per the FSSAI Annual Report 2021, there were only 2,531 FSOs for regulating around one crore street vendors. The last CAG performance audit report released in 2017 reveals that the availability of FSOs was significantly below the required levels, with vacancy rates ranging between 33% and 90% across various states. In Maharashtra, out of a sanctioned strength of 307 FSOs, only 118 positions were filled, leaving a 61% gap. Uttar Pradesh had 728 sanctioned posts, but only 330 officers were in place, resulting in a 55% shortfall. The situation was particularly dire in Jharkhand, where just 9 FSOs were posted against a requirement of 124, reflecting a 93% vacancy rate. Such a critical human resource deficit severely undermines the states' capacity to enforce food safety laws, carry out inspections, collect samples and initiate timely legal action against violators. In some regions, this shortage has practically rendered the enforcement machinery non-operational.

The FSS Act places a strong emphasis on routine food testing as part of its core regulatory function. However, its practical enforcement is significantly hindered on account of underdeveloped and poorly equipped laboratory infrastructure across India. According to the FSSAI Annual Report for 2021–22, although 178 laboratories have been officially recognised for testing, only 72 of these are managed by state governments. Among these laboratories, many do not possess accreditation from the National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories (NABL), which compromises the trustworthiness and legal validity of the test results. Moreover, a number of these laboratories are functioning without certified food analysts, in direct contravention of Section 45 of the FSS Act, which mandates the presence of qualified personnel for conducting valid and reliable analysis. Such non-compliance with the enforcement structure under the FSS Act resulted in dismissal of the case pertaining to the Maggi controversy.

The FSS Act envisages an efficient, scientifically grounded and responsive adjudication mechanism. However, the practical functioning of this framework often falls short of its legislative intent on account of systemic delays, procedural inconsistencies and administrative bottlenecks. In response to a question by a Member of Parliament, the Union Health Ministry informed that between 2018-19 to 2019-21, 1,906 samples failed out of 7,942 samples collected and in only 10 cases food business operators were convicted. The rate of successful conviction is less than 1%. This disparity screams of a broken adjudication system plagued by procedural irregularities, evidentiary lapses and administrative negligence. The inefficiency can be attributed to multiple factors, including incomplete or improperly compiled evidence and documentation, significant delays in receiving analytical reports from food testing laboratories, procedural violations, particularly regarding sampling and testing as outlined in Section 47 of FSS Act, and lack of legal diligence on the part of FSOs and designated officers when scrutinising cases before referral.

One glaring example of procedural failure is the failure of FSOs to serve notice in Form VA to respondents other than the food business operator, as mandated under Rule 2.4.1(4) of the Food Safety and Standards Rules (FSS Rules). This notice is critical because it enables the respondent to exercise their right under Rule 2.4.5(1) to have the fourth part of the sample tested at a NABL-accredited or FSSAI-notified laboratory. The failure to serve this notice not only constitutes a breach of procedural requirements, but also deprives the respondent of a substantive legal right, causing serious prejudice and vitiating the fairness of the proceedings. Such lapses point to a broader issue of administrative negligence and statutory non-compliance, which significantly undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the food safety enforcement mechanism in India.

This procedural breakdown is far from an isolated incident. A prominent example lies in the Nestle India Ltd v. FSSAI case, where FSSAI imposed a nationwide ban on MAGGI noodles, citing laboratory reports alleging excessive levels of lead and monosodium glutamate (MSG). The Bombay High Court, however, struck down the ban, observing that the reports relied upon were legally inadmissible. The laboratories in question were neither NABL-accredited nor FSSAI-notified, as mandated under Section 3(p) and Section 43 of the FSS Act. The ruling reinforced a sobering truth that when procedural rigour is sacrificed, even well-intentioned actions collapse. Ultimately, the system appears more adept at generating headlines than delivering justice, allowing major violators to slip through while minor offenders are held to task.

In addition to these procedural failures, Food Safety Appellate Tribunals, established to provide quasi-judicial oversight and facilitate appeal processes, have also been marred by operational setbacks which include prolonged vacancies in key positions and inadequate administrative support. This reflects a deeper institutional inertia that undermines public trust in the food regulatory system and compromises the broader objective of ensuring food safety through timely legal redress.

Section 29 of the FSS Act outlines that the responsibility for implementing food safety regulations at the state level lies primarily with the Commissioners of Food Safety. However, the coexistence of central oversight through FSSAI and enforcement roles delegated to state-level authorities such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDAs) has created a complex and, at times, inconsistent regulatory structure. This overlapping jurisdiction often leads to confusion in implementation, delays in action and accountability gaps. Further, designated officers empowered to determine whether violations should be compounded or prosecuted, are legally bound to act within the timeframes prescribed by Section 42(3) of the FSS Act.

Secondly, the lack of granular public data on offences under the FSS Act further complicates the issue of regulatory accountability. The National Crime Records Bureau does not maintain or publish category-specific statistics related to food safety violations, making it difficult to assess trends or benchmark enforcement outcomes. Moreover, the 2017 CAG Audit report revealed critical deficiencies in FSSAI’s internal monitoring mechanisms, highlighting the absence of a comprehensive audit framework and standardised performance indicators to evaluate the efficiency of FSOs or state enforcement agencies.

A comparison with global best practices highlights significant areas where India’s food safety framework can be strengthened. The European Union (EU) exemplifies a highly structured and transparent regulatory system, led by bodies like the European Food Safety Authority and the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed. These institutions ensure the timely dissemination of food safety information and adopt a precautionary approach that promotes public trust and proactive action. The EU’s harmonised regulations, stringent penalties and coordinated enforcement mechanisms provide a strong model of efficiency and effectiveness.

In contrast, the FSSAI, while making strides in public communication, still faces significant challenges in its disclosure practices. Information is often shared reactively and with delays, limiting public access to critical food safety updates. Moreover, despite the comprehensive framework set by the FSS Act, enforcement remains fragmented due to inconsistent application across states, inadequate resources,and procedural inefficiencies.

To strengthen India’s food safety enforcement framework, addressing the acute shortage of FSOs must be a priority. States should urgently fill these vacancies, potentially with support from centrally-allocated funds. In addition to recruitment, it is essential to institutionalise structured training programs for both FSOs and laboratory staff, with mandatory certification through FSSAI’s Food Safety Training and Certification initiative. Moreover, modernising enforcement practices through digital tools such as real-time inspection tracking apps and centralised dash boards can significantly enhance transparency and responsiveness in regulatory actions.

Ensuring accountability within the enforcement system requires well-defined performance benchmarks. Introducing key result areas for FSOs and publishing regular, state-wise performance evaluations would promote both transparency and measurable outcomes. Further, conducting annual independent audits of sampling procedures, prosecution effectiveness and conviction records will help assess operational efficiency. A broader oversight mechanism, such as tabling a comprehensive enforcement performance report in Parliament annually, can ensure institutional accountability and sustained policy focus.

In a nation with a population nearing 1.5 billion, systemic inadequacies in implementing food safety measures pose a serious risk to public health and consumer rights. As India advances toward its developmental and public health goals, it becomes imperative that the FSSAI, in coordination with state food safety authorities, discharges its statutory functions with greater rigour. These authorities must not merely operate as administrative entities, but must function as proactive custodians of food safety, upholding consumer welfare and reinforcing public confidence in the regulatory system.

Jyoti Khattar & Gaurav Mishra are Advocates practicing at Delhi High Court.