The saga of Justice Yashwant Varma has not yet closed. The request and suggestion of the Collegium to the judge to resign has been turned down. The judge appears to have decided to brazen it out. He is due to retire on Jan 5, 2031 and seems ready to face even the impeachment proceedings like Justice V Ramaswami.

The Indian judiciary, long held as a sentinel of democratic values and constitutional morality, periodically finds itself tested by episodes that bring into focus the fragile balance between institutional integrity and individual fallibility. The recent episode involving Justice Varma wherein a substantial sum of unaccounted cash was reportedly discovered from his residential premises, has catalysed an internal probe under the aegis of the Supreme Court’s in-house mechanism. This incident, remarkable for its rarity and seriousness, has prompted both public scrutiny and institutional introspection.

Often exalted as the guardian of the Constitution and democracy, the judiciary is institutionally designed to be insulated from political interference. Judicial independence is foundational to the doctrine of separation of powers. However, this insulation has come at a cost: a near-absolute absence of effective accountability mechanisms for judges of the higher judiciary. The impeachment process under the Constitution of India, though necessary as a last resort, is cumbersome, opaque and politically unviable, rendering it practically redundant. Voices like Justice VR Krishna Iyer, renowned for his intellectual independence and constitutional fidelity, long warned against this lacuna and strongly advocated for a permanent Judicial Accountability Commission.

We need to be aware of the structural infirmities in the present process of impeaching judges. The impeachment process for judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts is governed by Articles 124(4) and 217 of the Constitution, read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The process comprises several stringent procedural steps:

(i) Initiation requires  a motion supported by at least 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members.

(ii) The Speaker or Chairman admits the motion and constitutes a three-member inquiry committee (a Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court and a distinguished jurist).

(iii) If the committee finds the judge guilty of “misbehaviour or incapacity”, the motion is put to vote.

(iv) Both Houses must pass the motion by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, and an absolute majority of the total membership.

Though constitutionally rigorous to prevent political misuse, this process is so formidably difficult and politicised that no judge has ever been successfully impeached in Indian history, despite credible allegations of misconduct (Justices Ramaswami, Soumitra Sen, PD Dinakaran and more recently, Justice SN Shukla).

The requirement of legislative sponsorship of the motion makes the process vulnerable to political bias, inertia and horse-trading. Proceedings are conducted in near-secrecy, leaving little scope for public scrutiny or confidence in outcomes. The binary nature of the process (either total exoneration or removal) leaves no room for lesser sanctions like censure, suspension or reprimand. The inquiry committee comprises judges or jurists often drawn from the same professional circuit, raising concerns of internal bias and collegial protectionism.

Justice Krishna Iyer vigorously opposed the monopoly of internal self-regulation by the judiciary. He wrote extensively and argued for a permanent Judicial Accountability Commission (JAC), independent of both Parliament and the judiciary, to ensure regular oversight of judicial conduct, transparent and graduated disciplinary mechanisms, proactive response to complaints without waiting for extreme misconduct, and protection of judges from frivolous allegations while ensuring responsiveness to genuine ones. In his words,

“No constitutional functionary, not even a judge, is above the law. Immunity cannot mean impunity.”

He called for: (i) A broad-based, multi-member body comprising retired judges, jurists and civil society members; (ii) Annual disclosure of assets and financial interests by judges; (iii) Public reporting of judicial complaints and outcomes; (iv) Mechanisms for peer review, performance appraisal and education in judicial ethics.

India is among the very few democracies that have no operational judicial oversight body. In contrast, the United Kingdom has the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO), which investigates complaints against judges and publishes decisions. The United States follows a system of judicial conduct review commissions at the federal and state level with a range of disciplinary options. Canada has a Canadian Judicial Council that can investigate and recommend sanctions short of removal.

These jurisdictions demonstrate that institutional oversight and judicial independence are not mutually exclusive, but complementary pillars of a healthy constitutional democracy.

In 2010, the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill was introduced in Parliament, proposing asset declarations, a complaints mechanism and a National Judicial Oversight Committee. However, it lapsed in 2014 amidst strong opposition from sections of the judiciary, citing risks to independence. More recently, the judiciary has internally adopted in-house mechanisms, but these remain secretive, non-binding and lacking in enforcement power. The absence of statutory backing limits their credibility.

The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015, again reinforcing the judiciary’s exclusive domain, but leaving a void for external scrutiny. The credibility of the judiciary rests not only on its legal pronouncements but on the ethical conduct of its judges and the transparency of its institutional processes. The cumbersome, politically susceptible and opaque impeachment mechanism fails to deliver effective judicial accountability in modern constitutional India.

The vision of Justice Krishna Iyer, who anticipated the erosion of public trust in judicial self-regulation, remains more relevant than ever. A permanent Judicial Accountability Commission, statutorily constituted with safeguards for independence and due process, is essential to restore the balance between judicial autonomy and answerability.

Judicial independence must not become a veil behind which impunity thrives. A robust accountability mechanism is not a threat to the judiciary, it is its moral and democratic anchor.

Narasimhan Vijayaraghavan is a practicing advocate in the Madras High Court.